Shamsoddin Shariati: War cannot solve Iran-related issues in international relations.
The EU could adopt a non-hegemonic foreign policy toward Iran, relying on civic organizations and independent media to raise awareness about the country and its relations with the world
Vladimir Mitev
Shamsoddin Shariati is a PhD scholar in Politics at the National University of Ireland Maynooth and board member of the Irish Association for Contemporary European Studies. His research focuses on state capacity, public administration, trust-building mechanisms, crisis governance, and European Union studies. Follow him on X:
Shamsoddin Shariati recently published the following articles:
Donald Trump is 'all in' with Benjamin Netanyahu's illegal war on Iran (The Irish Examiner, 20 June 2025)
Unreliability of Donald Trump's US means a cascade of nuclear armament is on the way (The Irish Examiner, 4 July 2025)
Mr. Shariati, the 12-day war between Israel and Iran ended in a ceasefire. What's next for Iran and the region? How realistic is it that American-Iranian negotiations over a new nuclear agreement will resume? How likely is it that Iran will return to the global political and economic scene and receive sanctions relief?
First of all, I do not think that the war has ended, but rather that it is paused, because Israel has not yet achieved its objectives.
A profound distrust now exists between Iran and the US following the strikes, in addition to their pre-existing disagreements. While Iran insists on its right to enrich uranium based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the US demands zero enrichment in Iran.
The US knows, based on several reports, that it did not obliterate Iran's nuclear program, but merely delayed it by a period ranging from a few months to a few years, according to different assessments. Therefore, the US understands that negotiations are necessary to deal with the Iranian nuclear program, as it cannot resort to bombing every new enrichment facility that is built in Iran.
Furthermore, after a war, both sides, especially the one claiming victory, need an agreement to solidify what they have achieved. In this case, if the US believes it has successfully obliterated Iran's nuclear program, it needs an agreement with Iran to formalize this and prevent them from starting over.
Iran also needs a deal for sanctions relief, but it is unwilling to end its nuclear program. They are mindful of what happened to Libya, where NATO attacked and toppled the regime after Gaddafi ended the Libyan nuclear program. Of course, Iran's current situation is very different from Libya's; however, if Iran were to end its nuclear program, Israel and the US would face fewer obstacles to launching a more significant attack, and will pursue the regime change more seriously.
As we can see, France and some Western officials are demanding the inclusion of Iran's ballistic missile program in the negotiations. It is obvious that if Iran were to end its nuclear program, the US and its Western allies would then target its ballistic missile program. This war has demonstrated that ballistic missiles are Iran's most important deterrent against Israeli aggression. Iran believes that these growing demands from the US must stop at some point; otherwise, they will become an existential threat. That is why Iranians would rather fight than end their nuclear program. Therefore, as long as the US demands zero enrichment, I do not think any deal is achievable.
The zero-enrichment demand appeared unexpectedly from the Trump administration in the middle of negotiations. It is notable that under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was signed by the Obama administration, France, Germany, the UK, China, and Russia, in 2015, Iran's right to enrich uranium up to 3.67% was acknowledged, but Trump unilaterally withdrew the US from the agreement in 2018.
The Iranian parliament approved a bill to suspend cooperation with the IAEA. What can we expect from the Islamic Republic regarding its nuclear program after the 12-day war? How likely is it that Iran will transition from a peaceful nuclear program to a weapons-grade one? How much harm has the 12-Day War caused to Iran's relations with the West and to trust in them?
As is explained in this article, voices advocating for the creation of a nuclear deterrent have intensified following the joint Israel-US attack on Iran. In addition to suspending cooperation with the IAEA, the Iranian parliament is preparing legislation to withdraw from the NPT. However, I do not think that Iran will make a nuclear weapon in the near future for a few reasons. First, Iran has suffered a significant setback in its nuclear program. Second, the recent war revealed the extensive reach of Israeli and US intelligence within Iran's military and political establishments. If any political will for moving towards the bomb develops among high-ranking political figures in Iran, the US and Israel will be informed and, therefore, will do anything to prevent it.
What role could the E3 countries (Germany, France, and the UK) play in international relations with Iran now? To what extent the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe could have a contribution to diplomacy with Iran in the time that comes?
After the Trump administration withdrew the US from the JCPOA in 2018 and initiated its "maximum pressure" campaign against Iran, the European countries that remained in the agreement attempted to salvage it. In 2019, they negotiated a deal with Iran and established a mechanism called the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX). Its primary goal was to facilitate legitimate trade between European companies and Iran, specifically by circumventing U.S. sanctions that restricted financial transactions. However, INSTEX failed and was dissolved in 2023 after facilitating only a single transaction. European companies and financial institutions remained hesitant to engage with the mechanism, fearing potential repercussions from the United States' secondary sanctions.
In the wake of the recent illegal attack on Iran, the EU has adopted a counterproductive position, especially considering it occurred amid nuclear negotiations. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen urged Iran to return to negotiations but hesitated to condemn the attack, even while Iran's nuclear program was operating with full transparency under the NPT.
Furthermore, some European leaders have taken irresponsible positions. For instance, Kaja Kallas, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, has made statements suggesting that negotiations to end Iran's nuclear program should begin, seemingly ignoring the existing framework. This stance contradicts the EU's position as a signatory to the JCPOA, which acknowledges Iran's right to enrich uranium up to 3.67%. Additionally, France’s foreign ministry has stated that Iran’s ballistic missile program should be included in the negotiations. These demands, which are both inconsistent with previous agreements and potentially illegal, further complicate the negotiation process. Therefore, I am not quite optimistic about the EU’s potential role.
The EU could play a constructive role by mediating between Iran and the US, trying to rebuild the profound distrust that has followed this conflict. With support from the US, the EU should work to provide security and economic assurances to Iran, which would be essential for rebuilding trust and restarting negotiations.
A crucial first step in this trust-building process would be for the EU to refrain from activating the "snapback" mechanism included in the JCPOA. Snapback mechanism allows for the swift automatic re-imposition of all previously lifted United Nations (UN) sanctions on Iran. Avoiding this would be a significant gesture and a foundational step toward rebuilding trust between Iran and the US-EU bloc.
There is a thesis that Israel did not achieve its goals in the 12-Day War: the Iranian nuclear program was not destroyed, and there was no regime change in Iran. How would you describe Israel's position in the Middle East after the 12-Day War? What will Israel's next moves be vis-à-vis Iran? How will the war in Gaza unfold?
Indeed, Israel did not achieve its primary goals in the 12-day war, despite demonstrating significant military and intelligence strength. It is evident that Israel was attempting to provoke the toppling of the Iranian government after assassinating 20 top military generals, but this objective clearly failed. Furthermore, while the Iranian nuclear program sustained a major setback with US help, it was not obliterated. The technical knowledge remains in Iran, and as even President Donald Trump acknowledged, Iran retains the capability to build new uranium enrichment facilities.
On the other hand, Israel also suffered considerable damage to its military, energy, economic, and civilian infrastructure. Reports from Israeli authorities confirm that following retaliatory attacks by Iran, over 30,000 applications for building damage had been submitted by late June. A recent report from The Daily Telegraph detailed the extent of damage to five Israeli military bases. Additionally, the Haifa oil refinery was shut down due to direct hits, and operations at the bustling Port of Haifa faced disruptions. A missile strike near a Microsoft office in Beersheba, an important economic hub, damaged the building's exterior and caused significant local disruption. Much additional damage has likely gone unreported due to the strict censorship the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) imposes on media coverage.
According to a Haaretz report, intercepting Iranian missiles during the 12-day war cost Israel $1.5 billion. This required firing 93 THAAD missiles, which is equivalent to more than two years of US production for these missiles; in 2025, only 12 are produced.
Conversely, Israel demonstrated significant aerial and intelligence superiority. It used this advantage to inflict heavy damage on Iran's air defense and offensive capabilities. They killed almost 1,000 civilians and damaged or destroyed thousands of targets across Iran's economic, military, civilian, energy, nuclear, and industrial infrastructure. The hundreds of Israeli secret agents and operators inside Iran were crucial for inflicting maximum damage and locating high-ranking generals.
Israel is trying to establish itself as the regional hegemon and sees Iran not only as an existential threat but also as its main rival on this path. It has improved its strategic position against Iran since October 7th by decapitating Iran’s state and non-state allies one after another, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and Syria’s Assad regime. Consequently, Iran is now left without strong allies in the region, lacking significant support from China or Russia during the war, while Israel enjoys the backing of the US, its Western allies, and most Arab states in the region.
This 12-day war carried significant costs for both sides, and as President Donald Trump indicated, both are exhausted. Therefore, I believe it is too early to determine how Israel’s strategic position has truly changed as a result of the conflict.
If war cannot resolve the issues that some influential world powers have with Iran, to what extent can we expect a non-hegemonic approach toward Iran from its EU partners? What role do civic organizations, cultural associations, and independent media play in relations between Europe and the Middle East? Will relations with Iran and the region remain heavily securitized forever? Or will the people and citizens involved develop their own dynamics and agency?
I believe war cannot solve this issue. The United States cannot force a regime change in Iran, and short of another "forever war," it cannot obliterate Iran's nuclear capabilities. Therefore, diplomacy is the only viable option. For the reasons I have explained, Iran will not accept zero enrichment or the complete termination of its nuclear program during these negotiations.
Consequently, I believe the US should retreat from its senseless demand for Iran's "total surrender" and instead accept Iran's right to a peaceful nuclear program, as is recognized in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This shift might happen if a Democratic president comes to office in 2029, but it is unclear what will happen before then. We will have to wait and see whether the anti-war lobby can prevail in the White House and encourage the Trump administration to engage in meaningful negotiations.
For the foreseeable future, the EU will likely follow the US's lead on this issue. Therefore, the most constructive role the EU can play is to moderate the US's position and push the administration toward substantive talks. The EU can also help provide meaningful security and economic assurances for Iran to ensure that any future deal is sustainable and beneficial for them.
In this context, we should expect the EU to adopt a non-hegemonic approach toward Iran, especially after the recent war. Independent media and civic organizations should support this by increasing public awareness and campaigning against war and foreign interference in the domestic affairs of other countries. This includes opposing policies of regime change and attempts to dictate a nation's defensive programs, such as its missile capabilities, thereby supporting the right of all nations to self-determination.
Independent media and cultural organizations should also focus on the devastating impact that sanctions can have on targeted countries. The secondary sanctions that the US imposes on nations are not just illegal but also inhumane, as they often restrict access to crucial medicines and other humanitarian necessities, effectively weaponizing them against a society and its government.
Furthermore, the Middle East, like other ancient regions, has a strong and rich history and culture of which many people in the West are not sufficiently aware. This lack of awareness allows politicians to more easily sell the idea that the Western lifestyle is superior and must be exported to other countries, and provides an excuse for interference. To counter this, civic organizations, cultural associations, and independent media should work to introduce the rich cultures of Middle Eastern countries, especially Iran, to the rest of the world.



Interesting. Thanks for this. For Trump, Iran was a convenient diversion, for Netanyahu, Trump was a convenient idiot. Here’s my take (2nd of 2 articles on the nukes aspect): https://shalyn8.substack.com/p/iran-and-the-bomb-separating-threat